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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/07/2005

Accident number: 413

Accident time: 10:15

Accident Date: 27/06/2004

Where it occurred: Puliyankulam village,
Vavuniya District,
Vanni

Country: Sri Lanka

Primary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)
Class: Other

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 28/06/2004

ID original source: KS

Name of source: LA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: P4Mk1 AP blast
boosted

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard

Date record created: 06/07/2005

Date last modified: 06/07/2005

No of victims: 0

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: See map under "Other Coordinates fixed by:
documents"
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: MF HDU 089

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
non injurious accident (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
Details were made available by the demining group involved in October 2004. The IMSMA
report, the content of which is summarised below, followed by the statements gathered by the
internal investigation.
“During the resting time the water tanker came inside of the minefield to water the minefield.
When they complete watering they wanted to reverse the tanker and unfortunately the track
was the place between bund and Base line.”
“The driver of the water tanker wanted to reverse the tanker and unfortunately he drove in
side of uncleared area.”
The tyre of the tanker was damaged when it ran over a PK-Mk4 AP mine “attached to a
60mm mortar”.

[The blast crater left by the device is shown above.]
The accident occurred on what was described as a “hard”, “hillside” with “medium” “grass”
cover.

The site had been last QA inspected during the previous month (the IMSMA date field
does not require a day, merely a month and year).
The demining group had been working at the site for 3 months, 1 week and three days. Work
had been progressing on the day for 5 minutes when the initiation occurred.
The accident was reported to the demining group HQ on 28/06/2004 at 10:00. The IMSMA
report was dated “09/06/2004” [clearly an entry unchanged from the previous accident report].

Statements
Statement Of Section Leader [Name excised]
I am the section leader of Team 07 – 2 Southern Group at 10.15 while we all were at rest
area on rest suddenly heard an explosion and saw smoke coming from close to bund. At
once I went to the site of the explosion of the spot and I found the water tanker was on
uncleared area and with no damage or injury. So I instructed to driver reverse the vehicle
using the same track. Driver followed me.
Section leaders additional comments: I believe that once three months before one day was
very rainy so that date the team leader allowed to reverse the vehicle by using this same land
but the driver was regional. But in this time driver was not regional and he didn’t ask us
anything.

Deminer of Section 2 team 7 [Name excised]
I am the deminer of section 2 of team 07 and have been working in this team for last 7
months. I normally help water tank at the same manner while I was on the top of tanker after
completing pouring water the driver managed to reverse on the base line but he couldn’t then
suddenly I heard an explosion but I didn’t step on the floor but the driver was close to the
back side wheel then I step on floor.
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Statement of Driver [Name excised]
I am [name excised] temporary driver of this water tanker while the regional driver was on
leave I was the driver after pouring water to this minefield I wanted to reverse the tanker in the
first time I reversed in appropriate place and in this time I used the uncleared area and I heard
an explosion then I realized there was an mine accident for my vehicle.
Normally the driver used the base line and safety path to transport. When I trying to reverse
the vehicle the cleaner said that we can reverse here and I followed.

Cleaner of water tanker [Name excised]
I am the cleaner and helper of this water tanker. I have been working here for last three
months. To day the regional driver wasn’t with us so we replaced a new driver. We watered
two times on this day and when we trying to get back out of mine field we should reversed.
But the room wasn’t enough so I mentioned once we used the uncleared area that was
happened three months before with Team leader’s permission but this time we didn’t ask
them.

MAPS
A map of the accident area is shown below.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the water
bowser used was too big to be safely manoeuvred inside the mined area. It had been unable
to turn without using the uncleared area on a previous occasion and the driver had been
instructed to use the uncleared area. The instruction to use an uncleared area for vehicle
turning is the reason that the secondary cause of the accident is listed as a “Field control
inadequacy”. The field supervisors could have ordered areas close to the bund to be cleared
so that the vehicle could manoeuvre on cleared land, but did not do so.
The accident investigation is listed under “Notes” as inadequate because it includes no
conclusions or recommendations. The statements gathered included contradictions and did
not explain how the device was identified. The AP blast mine might be expected to have
punctured a tyre, but the 60mm mortar attached apparently did no damage, which seems
strange.
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The demining group involved developed a Safe-lane water bowser capable of moving inside 2
metre wide lanes and reversing along them during 2005.

4

